





The Problem with the Problem 
of Consciousness
Abstract
This paper proposes that the ‘problem of consciousness’, in its most popular formulation, is 
based upon a misinterpretation of the structure of experience. A contrast between my sub-
jective perspective (A) and the shared world in which I take up that perspective (B) is part of 
my experience. However, descriptions of experience upon which the problem of conscious-
ness is founded tend to emphasise only the former, remaining strangely oblivious to the fact 
that experience involves a sense of belonging to a world in which one occupies a contingent 
subjective perspective. The next step in formulating the problem is to muse over how this 
abstraction (A) can be integrated into the scientifically described world (C). I argue that the 
scientifically described world itself takes for granted the experientially constituted sense of 
a shared reality. Hence the problem of consciousness involves abstracting A from B, deny-
ing B and then trying to insert A into C, when C presupposes aspects of B. The problem 
in this form is symptomatic of serious phenomenological confusion. No wonder then that 
consciousness remains a mystery.
Keywords
consciousness,	 heterophenomenology,	 naturalism,	 objectivity,	 phenomenology,	 sense	 of	
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Introduction
The	problem	of	 consciousness	or	 “hard	problem	of	 consciousness”,	 if	 you	
































in	 this	way	but	 they	can’t	 really	–	 they’re	confused.	The	 ‘problem	of	con-
sciousness’	that	they	are	preoccupied	with	is	not	that	of	reconciling	human	




start	 off	 with	 an	 acceptable	 –	 albeit	 provisional	 and	 incomplete	 –	 descrip-
tion	of	what	it	is	that	we	are	seeking	to	explain.	So	how	is	‘consciousness’	





























































































odorous	objects	such	as	they	appeared	to	me	in this laboratory at Paris on a day in February,	
etc.	And	if	despite	all	we	are	to	consider	this	ensemble	as	subjective,	then	why	should	we	reco-
gnize	objectivity	in	the	system	of	objects	which	were	revealed	to	the	experimenter,	this	same	
day	 in	February?	[….]	 I	shall	give	 the	name	subjectivity	 to	 the	objectivity	which	I	have	not	
chosen.”	(1989,	p.312)
In	this	passage,	Sartre	appreciates	that	experience	does	not	take	the	form	of	







entity	 residing	 in	 the	 objective	 world	 revealed	 to	 the	 experimenter’s	 gaze.	
Conversely,	 the	 experimenter’s	objective	world	 is	 itself	 a	 subjective	world	
from	the	perspective	of	her	experimental	subject.	Of	course,	one	could	retort	





















































employers,	listeners,	readers,	masters,	servants,	etc.,	act	out	their	roles.	As bearers of these roles 
in the ‘co-included’ situations (and only in these roles of theirs), those who belong to the world 
of fellow human beings appear in the references mentioned.”	(1979,	p.	98)
Exactly	the	same	things	are	not	taken	for	granted	in	every	case.	But	some-
thing at	 least	 is	always	taken	for	granted	as	shared;	some	aspect	of	experi-













perience	 is	 described	 by	 Sartre	 in	 his	 novel	 Nausea.	 In	 place	 of	 the	 usual	























































gardless	of	who	uses	it.	It	appears	as to be used in a certain way,	rather	than	





























































































Dennett,	 in	 describing	 his	 own	 conception	 of	 phenomenology,	 appeals	 to	
the	Sellarsian	contrast	between	scientific	and	manifest	images,	and	proposes	
that:




However,	 each	 subject’s	 experience	 is	not	 simply	 ‘subjective’	but	 involves	
being	part	of	a	shared	experiential	world.	A	subjective manifest image	is	not	
to	be	contrasted	with	the manifest image.	The	‘manifest	ontology	of	a	subject’	














How	does	 the	 scientific	world	 relate	 to	 the	world	of	everyday	experience?	
With	 a	 significantly	 revised	 description	 of	 consciousness	 (which	 acknow-
ledges	that	consciousness	includes	the	sense	of	occupying	a	contingent	and	
























some	aspects	of	experience,	including	the sense of reality.	To	conclude	this	
paper,	I	will	briefly	sketch	a	transcendental	argument	for	this	claim.	A	far	more	























‘real’	 and	 ‘unreal’;	 one	must	 understand	what	 the	modalities	 of	 belief	 are.	
So	where	does	this	sense	of	the	real	come	from?	First	of	all,	it	is	clear	that	































Of	 course,	we	will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 study	 the	 structure	of	 our	 sense	of	 real-
ity	 if	we	are	pre-occupied	exclusively	with	what	 the	constituents	of	 reality	
are.	The	sense	of	reality	is	presupposed	by	the	project	of	charting	what	the	
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Matthew Ratcliffe
Das Problem mit dem Problem 
des Bewusstseins
Zusammenfassung
In dem Artikel wird die These vertreten, dass sich das – um es in populärster Weise zu formu-
lieren – „Problem des Bewusstseins” auf einer falschen Interpretation der Erfahrungsstruktur 
gründet. Der Kontrast zwischen meiner subjektiven Perspektive (A) und der gemeinsamen Welt, 
in der ich meine Perspektive einnehme (B), ist Bestandteil meiner Erfahrung. Beschreibungen 
von Erfahrungen, die den Grundstein für die Bewusstseinsausbildung legen, neigen jedoch 
dazu, lediglich Ersteres zu betonen, wobei sie merkwürdigerweise die Tatsache vergessen, dass 
Erfahrung mit einschließt, sich zugehörig zu der Welt zu fühlen, in der man eine kontingente 
subjektive Perspektive einnimmt. Der nächste Schritt bei der Formulierung des Problems ist, 
darüber nachzudenken, wie diese Abstraktion (A) in die wissenschaftlich beschriebene Welt (C) 
integriert werden kann. Der Verfasser stellt die Behauptung auf, dass die wissenschaftlich be-
schriebene Welt selbst das durch die Erfahrung konstituierte Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit zu einer 
gemeinsamen Wirklichkeit als selbstverständlich voraussetzt. Daher schließt das Problem des 
Bewusstseins mit ein, dass A von B abstrahiert und B abgestritten wird; sodann wird versucht, 
A in C zu insertieren, wenn C Aspekte von B voraussetzt. Das so geartete Problem ist symp-
tomatisch für massiven phänomenologischen Wirrwarr. Demnach verwundert nicht, dass das 
Bewusstsein weiterhin ein rätselhaftes Phänomen ist.
Schlüsselbegriffe







La Question du Problème du Problème 
de la Conscience
Résumé
L’article affirme que le « problème de la conscience », dans sa formulation la plus répandue, 
est fondé sur une interprétation erronée de la structure de l’expérience. Le contraste entre « ma 
perspective subjective » (A) et « le monde partagé dans lequel j’adopte cette perspective » (B) 
fait partie de mon expérience. Néanmoins, les descriptions de l’expérience sur lesquelles est 
fondé le problème de la conscience n’ont tendance qu’à l’accentuer, négligeant étrangement 
le fait que l’expérience implique le sens d’appartenance au monde dans lequel on occupe une 
perspective subjective contingente. L’étape suivante de la formulation de ce problème consiste 
à réfléchir sur ce comment cette abstraction (A) peut être intégrée dans un monde décrit scienti-
fiquement. (C). Je soutiens que le monde décrit prend scientifiquement lui-même pour acquis le 
sens de la réalité partagée basée sur l’expérience. Par conséquent, le problème de la conscience 
implique de soustraire A de B, de nier B puis d’essayer d’insérer A dans C, tandis que C présup-
pose des aspects de B. Le problème de cette forme est symptomatique d’une importante confusi-
on phénoménologique. Il n’est donc pas étonnant que la conscience demeure un mystère.
Mots-clés
conscience,	hétérophénoménologie,	naturalisme,	objectivité,	phénoménologie,	sens	de	réalité,	subjec-
tivité
